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Abstract
Using one’s success and failure experiences can be an indicator of how well risk is being
managed in uncertain situations, particularly because exact probability information about
outcomes is often missing. Experience-based paradigms include this more real-world aspect of a
lack of information when studying risk taking behavior. This thesis builds upon experiencebased paradigms to include the element of skill.
A puzzle task was developed. A goal was given to participants to try to discern a pattern in each
puzzle that would yield consistently positive outcomes. Participants were randomly assigned to a
high or low success rate, but told that skill played a role in performance. The outcomes
associated with each puzzle were chosen by the participant, and served as a measure of risk
taking. After playing 41 puzzles, participants responded to scales measuring skill and chance
beliefs, and motivational focus.
Risk preferences were similar to experience-based paradigm predictions, though they were not
well-calibrated. Those with a high success rate took more risks relative to those with a low
success rate, but the results were less extreme than predicted. In addition, a closer look revealed
that the pattern for those with a low success rate began by increasing their risk taking, and then
did not decrease their risk taking significantly. Neither group felt that skill or chance was playing
a dominant role in outcomes, though self-serving bias was observed as better performance did
lead to higher ratings of skill. Overall, the results suggest that introducing the potential for skill
may change how people approach risk in ways not predicted by experience-based paradigms.
v

Striving for Success in an Uncertain Environment
We are often faced with situations that are uncertain and that we need to somehow
manage. Striving for success in uncertain situations provides a method for finding ways to
control the situation. Our idea of skill is reliant on our ongoing observations of the interaction
between uncertainty in the environment and outcomes of our attempts to be successful. To
succeed, we must reduce uncertainty by detecting regularities, and then use those regularities to
predict and control outcomes.
This combination of striving for success and attempting to manage uncertainty in the
environment is applicable to many different contexts, including the job market (e.g, Fugate,
Kinicki, & Ashforth, 2004) and academic settings (e.g., Chemers, Hu, & Garcia, 2001). Finding
a job, for instance, requires facing an ever-changing economy. Students in an academic setting
must handle different instructors, courses, and the transition from grade school to higher
education. Former success, whether it is in the job market, an academic setting, or another
context, undoubtedly influences beliefs about the role of skill which inform judgments of ability.
In the case of finding a job, former success influences perceptions regarding the ability to acquire
and maintain a job. Concerning school achievement, previous success influences beliefs
regarding the ability to achieve a high grade or acquire a particular degree.
The success of our efforts is important to our sense of skill. However, levels of success
are actually determined by a combination of skill and uncertainty in the environment. There is
1

uncertainty in the environment whenever we are unable to determine the likelihood of possible
outcomes. Dealing with this uncertainty while trying to succeed makes situations challenging.
The challenge can be thought of as the attempt to control the uncertainty in the situation through
skill. This thesis explores how people deal with challenging situations by applying their skill to
the existing uncertainty in an attempt to succeed. Specifically, we study how general willingness
to take risks is affected by one’s current level of success in an uncertain environment. We also
explore how level of success and risk-taking are related to inferences about the role of skill and
chance, as well as tendencies to adopt a motivational focus on approaching success versus
avoiding failure.
Defining and Studying Risk Taking
Risk and uncertainty go hand in hand. These concepts are studied in situations where it is
unclear which outcome will occur. Knowing the probabilities of the outcomes is characteristic of
a risky situation, while not knowing the probabilities of the outcomes is characteristic of an
uncertain situation. The real world, however, does not clearly make this distinction between
types of situations. Taking this into account, this thesis attempts to examine risk in an uncertain
situation. What exactly “risk” means depends on who is asked. While a layperson might view
risk as danger, psychologists and economists typically define risk as a function of variability
(e.g., Arrow, 1965: Lopes, 1983). Variability has to do with the spread of the distribution of
possible outcomes. The higher the variability in the situation, the greater the amount of risk. We
will use the scientific definition of risk as variance when studying risk in uncertain situations.
Researchers who study risky decision making often use paradigms in which the
environment is governed completely by chance, and the probabilities associated with the options
2

are explicitly stated. One of the most common risky choice paradigms is the gambling paradigm
(Lopes, 1983). In this paradigm, options are presented in a chance-driven environment as twooutcome gambles with stated probabilities. Choosing the riskier of the options is classified as
risk seeking, while choosing the safer of the options is classified as risk aversion. The gambling
paradigm has been used as far back as Daniel Bernoulli (1738/1954), who is considered by many
to be the father of economic utility theory. It has also been the primary paradigm used to develop
and test prospect theory (Kahneman & Tverky, 1979), which for more than thirty years has been
the dominant theory of risky choice in the field of judgment and decision making. While this
paradigm has been essential to the study of risky decision making, the paradigm is not
necessarily a good fit for every kind of risky choice. The characteristics of many real world
environments seem qualitatively different from what is assumed in the gambling paradigm.
For instance, people often do not have access to explicit probability information about
options. Instead, the information they would have access to when making decisions would be
their experiences regarding their successful and unsuccessful attempts at managing uncertainty in
similar situations. Also, people are typically not operating in an entirely chance-driven
environment. Instead, they are often operating in an environment in which there is the
opportunity for skill to be effectively exerted to influence the likelihood of outcomes. This
experiment described here is an attempt to address these two more common aspects of real world
environments that the gambling paradigm does not capture.
In order to do this, a puzzle task is used in which the goal is to correctly predict a pattern
in an attempt to win prizes. The task environment is one in which there is an expectation that
there is the potential for skill to contribute to success in identifying a pattern. At the same time,
3

there remains an element of uncertainty regarding the outcome of predictions. In lieu of exact
probability information, experiences of success and failure at attempting to predict a pattern will
be accessible to help gain a sense of the likelihood of various possible outcomes. Thus, this task
will help capture two important characteristics of risk within many real world environments: (1)
the potential for skill to help manage or reduce uncertainty and (2) the availability of information
in the form of success and failure experiences instead of probabilities.
Actual Success Rate and Risk Taking
In an uncertain situation, we do not have access to exact probability information.
Therefore, when making risky decisions, we rely on the availability of success and failure
experiences. The series of success and failure experiences is used to infer one’s success rate.
Success rate is one of the few pieces of information available to tell us about how well we are
managing risk in an uncertain situation. Several different paradigms have been used to examine
the relationship between success rate and risk taking behaviors. These different paradigms
sometimes incorporate aspects of the gambling paradigm and in other cases attempt to map more
closely onto more common characteristics of risk in the real world. Results suggest that success
rate information does influence risk preferences, and that the relationship changes depending on
the information provided to the decision maker by their task environment. These types of
differences have been extensively explored in what has been come to be known as the
“description-experience gap” (e.g., Hertwig & Erev, 2009).
Differences in risky decision making have been studied as a function of making decisions
based on descriptions of outcomes versus direct experience with outcomes (e.g., Hertwig &
Erev, 2009). Making decisions from description involves using direct information regarding
4

outcomes and their stated probabilities, as in the gambling paradigm. Making decisions from
experience involves relying on feedback gained from experience with available options to learn
about the likelihoods of outcomes.
Decisions about probabilities based on experience have been studied for decades, most
often in the context of multiple cue probability learning (see, e.g., Brehmer, 1980; Holzworth,
2001). These investigations explore whether and how people learn correct probabilities for
outcomes based on feedback. Although these studies indicate both strengths and weaknesses in
people’s abilities to learn from series of events, this paradigm has typically been used to study
the accuracy of predictions rather than inclinations regarding risk-taking.
Barron and Erev (2003) developed a task specifically designed to examine risk-taking
tendencies when choice feedback comes from experience. In this way, they could directly
compare risky choice when probabilities were experienced over time versus directly supplied in
a gambling-paradigm description. They created experience-based risky choices using what they
told subjects was a ‘computerized money machine.’ In this ‘computerized money machine,’ there
are two buttons on a computer screen, each representing a different gamble. The outcomes
corresponding to the different gambles are initially unknown to the participants. Participants
have the opportunity to click a button and obtain an outcome from the selected gamble. The two
gambles corresponding to the two buttons are either a risky option with two possible outcomes or
a safe option with a single outcome. Participants make choices in one of three types of
experience-based paradigms or in the description-based paradigm.
The three variants of the task include what the authors call the sampling, full feedback
and partial feedback paradigms. In the sampling paradigm, participants sample several outcomes
5

before they make a single, final choice. In the full feedback paradigm, participants continuously
receive feedback about both obtained and foregone outcomes across multiple trials. And in the
partial feedback paradigm, participants continuously receive feedback across trials but only
about the obtained outcomes. In several comparisons of description and experience-based risky
choices, Erev, Barron, and colleagues demonstrated systematic differences in preferences
(Barron & Erev, 2003; Erev et al., 2009, Hertwig & Erev, 2009).
In the experience-based paradigms, participants tended to be risk seeking when the more
desirable outcome in the risk had a higher probability and tended to be risk averse when the more
desirable outcome had a lower probability. For the description-based paradigm, participants
generally followed the opposite pattern. Participants tended to be risk averse when the more
desirable outcome had a higher probability and risk seeking when the more desirable outcome
had a lower probability. Moreover, prospect theory’s famous ‘reflection effect’ was reversed in
experience-based decisions. The original reflection effect was documented in the gambling
paradigm. Preferences for gambles were found to be typically risk averse for gains but risk
seeking when the outcomes were ‘reflected’ (about the y-axis on a graph) to become losses.
When comparable gambles are presented in an experience-based format, the opposite pattern
emerges, with tendencies toward risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses. These
differences in risk preferences have been termed the ‘description-experience gap.’
According to Hertwig and Erev (2009), the ‘description-experience gap’ is caused by the
way in which rare events are processed. Rare events are underweighted when making decisions
from experience, but are overweighted when making decisions from description. This
explanation suggests that, when decisions are made from experience, rare successes or rare
6

failures do not hold much weight when making risky decisions. This is because rare events are,
by definition, not often experienced. However, rare events remain salient in gambles wherein
the probabilities are explicitly stated. When salient, these rare events are exaggerated in
importance.
Research on the ‘description-experience’ gap provides insight into how acquiring
probability information via description or experience influences risk preferences. These methods
are particularly important when studying the relationship between success rate and risk taking.
Decision makers can be explicitly told how well or poorly they are doing, and they can learn
through their success and failure experiences. Below are examples of how different methods of
acquiring probability information can influence the relationship between success rate and risk
taking.
In a recent study, Schneider, Stershic and Ranieri (2013) explored the effects of repeated
good or bad outcomes on risk taking. Specifically, they examined whether one was more likely
to take a risk or play it safe when doing well versus poorly. Participants in this experiment saw
hypothetical 50/50 two-outcome gambles, and were asked to make a selection about which
gamble they preferred to play. Positive, negative and mixed experiences were created by
changing whether all of the possible outcomes in the gamble were positive, negative or a
mixture. The researchers found that, as participants started to have a negative experience and
began doing poorly, they took more risks than they did before they started having the negative
experience. Those who started to have a positive experience and began doing well took fewer
risks than they did before they started having the positive experience. If people use experiences
of doing well or poorly to inform them of their success rate, then these results suggest that those
7

with a higher success rate would take fewer risks, while those with a lower success rate would
take more risks.
Using hypothetical scenarios, Sitkin and Weingart (1995) found a different pattern of
results. They exposed participants to a hypothetical scenario in which they had to determine if it
was financially viable for their race car team to compete in the last race of their season. In this
scenario, the participants were either previously successful or unsuccessful as a result of previous
relevant decisions. The authors found that participants who were informed that they had
successfully made similar decisions in the past reported higher levels of risk propensity
(tendency to take risks) than those who were informed that they were unsuccessful. In contrast to
the Schneider et al. findings, these results suggest that those with higher success rates would take
more risks, while those with lower success rates would take fewer risks.
These two examples, one using a modified gambling paradigm and one using a
hypothetical scenario, suggest conflicting risk preference patterns for higher and lower success
rates. Sitkin and Weingart provided a description of the situation but did not give participants
exact probability information, while Schneider and colleagues had participants experience a
series of good or bad outcomes but did provide exact probabilities of 50/50. These differences in
results suggest that the expression of probabilities may be critical to the description-experience
gap. Sitkin and Weingart’s lack of exact probability information led to a preference pattern
similar to experience paradigms even with a description-based scenario. In contrast, the explicit
probabilities in Schneider et al.’s modified gambling paradigm resulted in preferences similar to
other description paradigms, even though good and bad experiences evolved over time.
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Work on the description-experience gap demonstrates that the way in which we obtain
information about likelihoods will influence how we feel about taking risks. Nevertheless,
neither the description nor experience paradigms take into account the real-world presence of the
element of skill in many situations involving uncertainty. The experience-based paradigms take
the first step to map onto real world situations in which exact probability information is not
available. This thesis extends these paradigms in an attempt to look at situations in which skill
has the potential to be involved. We examine not only general tendencies toward taking risks, but
also the extent to which people come to accurately gauge how much risk to take given
information from experience about their success rate. In addition, because the experiences we
are studying have the potential for skill to be involved, we also wanted to explore beliefs about
skill and chance in performance.
The Role of Inferences About Skill and Chance
Interpretation of success rate information is likely to be related to the perceived role of
skill and chance in real-world environments. The perceived role of skill refers to beliefs about
the extent to which one is able to impart some control over the outcomes that occur. Increases in
skill should be associated with increases in success rate. The perceived role of chance refers to
the beliefs about the extent to which the outcomes that occur are randomly determined or the
result of good or bad luck. The more that results are due to chance, the less opportunity there is
to be able to exert skill to control the outcomes.
Research has been done on the influence of beliefs about skill and chance in the
interpretation of a sequence of outcomes, particularly “streaks.” A streak refers to an
uninterrupted series, or string, of the same outcome. Examples include research on the gambler’s
9

fallacy and the hot hand effect, both of which deal with the interpretation of a streak in a
sequence of outcomes.
The gambler’s fallacy is the belief that a streak within a series of randomly determined
outcomes is less likely to continue and the opposite outcome is more likely to occur. So, if a
series of coin flips reveals a streak of several tails in a row, people will start to expect to see a
head revealed on the next toss. That is, they will come to believe that a head is more likely than
a tail to be the next outcome, even though the odds are 50/50 on every trial. This effect was first
demonstrated by Laplace (1951), and has been demonstrated in actual bets placed at a casino
(Croson & Sundali, 2005). Evidence was found that people bet based on belief in the gambler’s
fallacy. After a streak of five or more of a particular outcome, people were more likely to bet
against the streak than with the streak.
The hot hand effect is a related but contrasting phenomenon in which people have the
expectation that a streak of a particular outcome is likely to continue because a person is “hot.”
Gilovich, Vallone and Tversky (1985) demonstrated this effect within the sport of basketball.
They found that people believed a basketball player to be more likely to score if they had already
done so a few times in a row than if they had recently missed. The basketball player was said to
have had a “hot hand,” and the streak of successful shots was judged to be more likely to
continue than not.
The difference between these effects lies in whether a streak of a particular outcome is
expected to continue or not continue. The streak is expected to continue according to the hot
hand effect, while the streak is not expected to continue according to the gambler’s fallacy. This
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difference in expectation can make the effects seem contradictory, but this contradiction can be
resolved when beliefs about skill and chance are examined.
To better understand the gambler’s fallacy and hot hand effect, Ayton and Fisher (2004)
studied the attributions of skill and chance that people made regarding different types of
sequences. They presented participants with three sets of binary sequences. Participants were
told to identify whether the sequence was an output from human skill or chance performance.
The authors found that participants were more likely to attribute sequences with more streaks to
human skill. Sequences with fewer streaks were found to be attributed to chance. These findings
suggest that how success rate is interpreted is related to the extent to which the sequence that
makes up the success rate is perceived to be a result of skill or chance. If the sequence of
outcomes is consistent, then the success rate would typically be interpreted as due to high or low
skill. If the sequence of outcomes is variable, then the success rate would tend to be interpreted
as due to chance.
In a similar vein, Burns and Corpus (2004) studied when people would be more likely to
predict a continuation of a streak of outcomes. They found that it depended on whether the
mechanism generating the outcomes was believed to be random or non-random. Participants in
this experiment read a hypothetical scenario about a sequence that was said to be random or nonrandom. They were then asked to choose which outcome they thought would occur next. The
authors found that a streak was continued more often for the non-random scenarios than the
random scenario. These findings have implications for how success rate information is
interpreted and used. When the sequence of outcomes used to determine success rate is
interpreted to be non-random (i.e., due to skill), a streak is thought to be more likely to continue.
11

When the sequence of outcomes used to determine success rate is interpreted to be due to
chance, a streak is thought to be less likely to continue.
The results of these experiments provide evidence for the role of skill and chance in
interpretation of success rate information. Whether the success rate is interpreted as a result of
skill or chance depends on the consistency or variability of the sequence of outcomes. Also,
whether a streak is expected to continue depends on the extent to which it is interpreted as a
result of skill or chance. This is important to consider when studying the relationship between
success rate and risk taking.
If success rate is interpreted as being due more to skill, then similar to the expectation in
the hot hand effect, a more consistent and non-random streak would be expected to continue. The
willingness to take a risk could increase for those experiencing a streak of successes because one
would expect to succeed as a result of skill intervening in that risky decision. A streak of failures
might also be expected to continue if skill did not seem enough to bring about successes. In this
case, the willingness to take a risk could decrease because one would expect to fail and would
therefore try to take the safest course possible. These patterns are similar to results from
experience-based paradigms, but a difference is that hot hand research includes beliefs about
skill as part of the rationale for the pattern. Thus, it should be possible to see differences in risktaking among those with equivalent success rates depending on beliefs about the role of skill.
If success rate is interpreted as being due solely to chance, then similar to the expectation
in the gambler’s fallacy, a less consistent and more random streak would not be expected to
continue. A streak of successes might not be expected to continue, and the opposite outcome of
failure would be expected. Therefore, the willingness to take a risk could decrease because one
12

would expect that failure is imminent, so minimizing losses would seem most important. A
streak of failures might also not be expected to continue, and instead the opposite outcome of
success would be expected. In this case, the willingness to take a risk could increase because one
would expect that a success must be coming soon, and so going for larger potential gains would
seem attractive. These predictions would not typically be expected, however, as the situation of
interest is one that is believed to involve elements of both skill and chance.
The role of skill and chance is important when making risky decisions in an uncertain
environment, as it has implications for how likelihoods and streaks of outcomes are interpreted
and used. Related to the expectation in the hot hand effect that streaks are more likely to
continue, we conduct exploratory analyses to see if patterns of risk taking varied as a function of
beliefs about skill independent of success rate. We also examine beliefs about skill and chance to
see if they differ as a function of success rate. We base our predictions on the well-known selfserving bias (e.g., Heider, 1958; Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). Self-serving bias is a
phenomenon in which attributions made after experiencing success are different than ones made
after experiencing failure. In an effort for people to enhance or protect their self-concept,
experiencing success is often attributed to themselves and something they did (e.g., used their
skill), while experiencing failure is attributed to the environment (e.g., chance). Exploratory
analyses were also conducted to see whether motivational focus varied depending on success
rate.
Exploring the Role of Motivational Focus
It is common knowledge that there exist fundamental motivations to approach pleasure
and avoid pain. By the same token, we are motivated to approach success and avoid failure.
13

Research suggests that, not only do these motivations exist, but there are individual differences
in which motivation tends to predominate. Instead of looking at individual differences in
motivational focus, this thesis will explore whether experiencing a high or low success rate can
direct one’s motivations towards approaching the positive versus avoiding the negative.
Atkinson’s (1957) theory of the motivation to achieve success versus avoid failure
focused on situations that involve some skill and some chance. Atkinson demonstrated that there
are individual differences in types of task chosen and willingness to take on risks, depending on
the stronger motivational focus. He found that those who had a stronger motive to achieve
success were willing to take on a moderate amount of risk. Those who had a stronger motive to
avoid failure were willing to take on either extremely high (self-handicapping) or extremely low
(ensured success) amounts of risk.
Lopes (1983) also described motivational differences, but in the context of purely chance
events. SP/A theory is a two factor theory of risky choice that includes a dispositional factor that
disposes people towards choosing to take a risk or to play it safe. Lopes proposed a motivational
continuum in which people were predominantly motivated by security concerns or by desires for
potential. Security-oriented individuals are motivated to avoid the worst outcomes in risky
situations, whereas potential-oriented individuals are motivated to obtain the greatest benefit in
risky situations.
Additionally, Crowe and Higgins (1997) demonstrated motivational focus differences in
a memory task. They found that those with an induced promotion focus to pursue positive
outcomes were more concerned with getting hits (correctly recognizing previously presented
words), and therefore had a riskier bias of saying ‘yes’ for recognition of words. Those with an
14

induced prevention focus to avoid negative outcomes were more concerned with getting correct
rejections (correctly avoiding words that were not previously presented), and therefore had a
conservative bias of saying ‘no’ for recognition of words.
Potential differences in motivational focus seem especially relevant when making risky
decisions in an uncertain environment that involves skill. Although motivational focus regarding
approaching success and avoiding failure are typically studied as individual differences, we
hypothesized that differences in motivational focus may also occur due to experience and would
be in line with experience-based paradigm predictions. When predominately experiencing
successes, one may come to expect them based on skill, and therefore be more motivated to
approach the positive, and take a risk. Taking the risk might be seen as worth it given that you
can exert skill in order to possibly succeed as a result. When predominately experiencing
failures, one may become more concerned about the inability to exert skill to avoid failures,
making it more appealing to play it safe.
Aims and Hypotheses
The overall aim of this thesis is to explore how people deal with challenging situations by
attempting to apply their skill to the existing uncertainty to increase their likelihood to succeed.
Specifically, this thesis examined how general willingness to take on risk is affected by one’s
current success rate in an uncertain environment that ostensibly involves skill. If success rate
information is used in lieu of exact probabilities when making risky decisions, then different
success rates are likely to elicit different risk preferences. In addition, the role of inferences
about skill and chance, and differences in motivational focus are explored, as these may be
related to reactions to different success rates.
15

Success rate and risk taking: General test of experience-based paradigm
predictions. Overall, success rate was expected to influence the willingness to take on more or
less risk. It was hypothesized that a low success rate would lead to a reduced willingness to take
on risk. A high success rate was expected to lead to a greater willingness to take on risk. This
pattern is consistent with experience-based paradigm predictions (e.g., Hertwig & Erev, 2009).
This was expected because participants are not given explicit probability information and instead
have to experience their successes and failures, similar to experience-based paradigms.
Success rate and risk taking: More stringent test of experience-based paradigm
predictions. Additionally, how well people are calibrated in their risk taking based on their
success rate was also of interest because it was a way of measuring how well people responded
to success rate information. This is a more stringent test of the experience-based paradigm
predictions. We expected those with a lower success rate to take on a lower level of risk
compared to their optimal level of risk. In other words, they would be more risk averse than what
would be optimal. This is because they are expected to underestimate the likelihood of positive
outcomes because they are relatively rare. For those with a high success rate, the opposite pattern
is predicted by the experience-based paradigm. They are expected to take on a higher level of
risk compared to their optimal level. This is because, for them, the relatively rare events are the
negative outcomes. If they underestimate the negative outcomes, they should be overconfident
and relatively risk seeking.
If results go against our predictions, the description-based paradigm may provide a better
fit. If this happens, results may be more consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979) predictions. Prospect theory predicts the overestimation of relatively rare events, so that
16

those with a low success rate are expected to overshoot their optimal level of risk and be
relatively more risk seeking, while those with a high success rate should be relatively risk averse
and undershoot their optimal level of risk. If these are the results, then it suggests that something
other than explicit probability information may bring about the prospect theory predicted pattern.
Beliefs about skill and chance: Predictions related to hot hand. The role of inferences
about skill and chance was studied in a more exploratory manner. If participants tend to attribute
their performance to skill, then similar to the expectation in the hot hand effect, streaks would be
expected to continue. With a high success rate, those who attribute their performance primarily
to skill should take on more risk than they otherwise would because they expect their good
performance to continue. With a low success rate, the opposite pattern is expected, in which
attributions of skill lead to risk aversion for fear that bad performance will continue. If chance is
seen as having a primary or the only role in performance, then similar to the expectation in the
gambler’s fallacy, streaks would not be expected to continue. Risk preference patterns opposite
of those mentioned above would be predicted. Because we designed the task to appear to involve
skill, these results would be unexpected.
Beliefs about skill and chance: Test of self-serving bias. We also explored overall
differences in attributions of skill and chance as a function of success rate. For both conditions, it
was expected that performance would be attributed more to skill than chance, particularly
because skill is explained and reinforced as a factor in performance. Nevertheless, those with a
high success rate are apt to believe that skill had more of a role in their performance than those
with a low success rate. Those with a high success rate are also expected to believe that chance
had less of a role in their performance than those with a low success rate. This is consistent with
17

self-serving bias, in which people tend to attribute their successes to themselves and their failures
to their environment (e.g., Heider, 1958; Campbell & Sedikides, 1999).
Motivational focus. Finally, we explored whether success rate is likely to influence
motivational focus. Experiencing a lower success rate might focus attention on avoiding failure,
so that one might be more apt to play it safe in order not to lose. Experiencing a higher success
rate might focus attention on approaching success, so that one might be more willing to take a
risk in order to succeed. These differences in motivational focus would be consistent with
experience-based predictions of tendencies to underweight the rarer event, and might suggest an
underlying role for motivation in the direction of attention (or vice versa).
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Method
Participants
Two hundred and three participants were recruited for this experiment and earned
psychology course extra credit for their participation. Although demographic information was
not collected, the research population was likely to be consistent with undergraduate psychology
majors, the majority of whom are female and between 18-24 years old.
An online system used by the psychology department (SONA) identified and recruited
the potential participants. For individuals to be enrolled in the experiment, they had to be at least
18 years old and eligible to access the online system.
Materials and Stimuli
The entire experiment was conducted in a computer lab setting equipped with 11 desktop
computers. This allowed multiple people to participate in the experiment at the same time. The
experimental manipulation of success rate used a puzzle task in which the goal of the participant
was to try, through repeated button clicks, to discern a pattern that yielded consistently positive
outcomes.
At any given time, one puzzle was displayed on the computer screen. Figure 1 provides a
sample of a puzzle before any button has been selected.
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Figure 1. An example of the outset of the puzzle task
task. This figure illustrates a possible screen
that a participant would see when start
starting a new 6 x 6 puzzle. In this example, the participant had
chosen Win/Loss Combo 1, displayed in the upper left corner. The Current Total was displayed
above the puzzle,, which at the outset of each new puzzle was zero. The number in the upper right
corner indicates that there were 10 clicks remaining as was always the case at the outset of each
new puzzle.
Each puzzle consisted of 36 square buttons in a 6 x 6 square grid. There were three
characteristics of each button that distinguished it from the other buttons in the puzzle—button
puzzle
color, symbol, and symbol size. Button colors, symbols, and symb
symbol
ol sizes were chosen to be
highly distinctive within each puzzle. Nine sets of button colors and 9 sets of distinct button
symbols were randomly distributed across puzzles.
To play the puzzle, the participant clicked on a button to reveal the point outcome behind
the button. After a click, an outcome appeared, and was incorporated into a ‘Current Total’ for
that puzzle trial. The outcome was either a positive ‘winning’ value or a negative ‘losing’ value.
On the next click, the previous outcome disappeared leaving a blank gray space, while the
currently clicked button revealed the next outcome, and so on, until the participant had clicked
10 of the 36 buttons. The number of clicks remaining (‘Clicks Remaining’) out of 10 was
available throughout the puzzle ttrial
rial on the computer screen. Once the number of clicks equaled
zero, play on that particular puzzle was over, completing that puzzle trial. For an example a
puzzle with three clicked buttons, see Figure 2.
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Figure 2. An example of a puzzle with three clicked buttons. This figure illustrates the same
puzzle from Figure 1, but after three buttons had been clicked.. A button had been clicked when
the square went from colored to gray. The most recently clicked button shows a value of five,
five
and was added onto the
he Current Total to increase it from zero to five.
The outcomes associated with each puzzle were determined by a previously chosen
win/loss combo. There were 9 win/loss combos available, labeled Win/Loss Combo 1 through
Win/Loss Combo 9. Each combo was similar to a two
two-outcome
outcome gamble, in that there was an
associated ‘winning’ value and ‘losing’ value. As the win/loss combo level increased, the
extremeness of the positive and negative outcomes increased. Decisions had to be made between
safer levels with small gains but small or zero losses, and riskier levels wit
with
h large potential gains
but large potential losses. For an example of the win/loss combo selection screen, see Figure 3.

Figure 3. An example of the win/loss combo selection screen. This screen was used to select the
win/loss combo for the next two puzzles. The winning and losing values listed would be the
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outcomes for clicks in the next two puzzles. After every two puzzles, participants saw this screen
again and had the opportunity to choose the same or a different win/loss combo.
Each combo had an associated expected value (EV) for one click, depending on the
chosen win/loss combo and the manipulated success rate. Table 1 below presents this
information.
Table 1. The Expected Value of One Button Click Based on Win/Loss Combo and Success Rate
Success Rate
Low
High
12 out of 36
24 out of 36
buttons
buttons
0.333
0.667
Win/Loss Combo Winning Value
1
5
2
10
3
15
4
20
5
25
6
30
7
35
8
40
9
45
Seen by participants

Losing Value
0
-1
-3
-6
-10
-15
-21
-35
-50

1.665
2.663
2.994
2.658
1.655
-0.015
-2.352
-10.025
-18.365

3.335
6.337
9.006
11.342
13.345
15.015
16.352
15.025
13.365

Not seen by participants

The combo information on the left side of Table 1 outlines the win/loss combo number
and the associated winning and losing values. The participant had access to this information from
their win/loss combo selection screen (see Figure 3), but did not have direct access to the
expected value information on the right of Table 1. The expected values in the righthand
columns list the average winnings expected for one click of a button depending on the success
rate. For instance, a participant with an assigned low success rate might have chosen Win/Loss
Combo 2. If they did so, they would win 2.663 points for each button click on average. This does
not mean that they would actually win 2.663 points, as they would either win 10 points or lose 1
point. Instead, the 2.663 points refers to what they would win if they clicked a random button
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repeatedly over the long run   .33310

.6671 . The highlighted expected values in

the table show the combos that would result in achieving the highest expected values in each
condition. The dark gray highlighting indicates the largest expected value and therefore the
optimal win/loss combo for each success rate. If participants were calibrating their chosen combo
to their success rate, they would ultimately select the combo that afforded them the dark grayhighlighted expected values, as these optimal win/loss combos would be expected to earn the
most points. For high success rate participants, the optimal win/loss combo was Combo 7, while
for low success rate participants, the optimal win/loss combo was Combo 3.
Design
The primary independent variable was a between-subjects manipulation of success rate,
with participants randomly assigned to one of two levels. Success rate refers to the likelihood
that the participant would get the winning value when they clicked on one button in the puzzle.
The two levels of the success rate variable were low and high. This was achieved using a success
rate of 33% (12 winning outcomes out of 36 buttons) and 67% (24 winning outcomes out of 36
buttons), respectively.
The primary dependent variable of interest was risk taking. Risk-taking behaviors were
measured by the chosen win/loss combos. As the win/loss combos increase, risk increases. The
higher the combo selected, the greater the willingness to take risk. In addition, items regarding
skill, chance, and motivational focus were assessed in an exploratory manner. Satisfaction with
performance and decision strategy were also assessed as a manipulation check, in that those with
a high success rate should be more satisfied with their performance and decision strategy than
those with a low success rate. The five ratings scales are presented in Table 2.
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Table 2. Five Scale Endpoints Used to Measure Attributions, Satisfaction and Motivational
Focus
Construct
Skill
Skill
Skill
Skill
Chance/Luck
Chance/Luck
Chance/Luck
Chance/Luck
Performance Satisfaction
Performance Satisfaction
Performance Satisfaction
Performance Satisfaction
Decision Strategy Satisfaction
Decision Strategy Satisfaction
Decision Strategy Satisfaction
Decision Strategy Satisfaction
Success/Failure Focus
Success/Failure Focus
Success/Failure Focus
Success/Failure Focus

Negative End of Scale
My current total was not due to my skill.
My skill had no influence over my performance.
My skill is not responsible for how much I won or lost.
My skill had nothing to do with my scores.
I feel that the odds were against me.
I was unlucky in my puzzle outcomes.
Overall I was unlucky.
I feel that my scores were due to bad luck.
I feel like I did not do well.
I feel like I could have done better.
I expected to do better.
I am not satisfied with my score.
I am disappointed in my decision strategy.
I am not happy with my decision strategy.
My decision strategy was not effective.
I feel bad about my decision strategy.
I was focused on avoiding negative outcomes.
In this task, I mostly thought about potential failure.
I saw myself as striving to prevent poor performance.
Mostly I imagined myself making bad puzzle button selections.

Positive End of Scale
My current total was due to my skill.
My skill had substantial influence over my performance.
My skill is responsible for how much I won or lost.
My skill had everything to do with my scores.
I feel that the odds were in my favor.
I was lucky in my puzzle outcomes.
Overall I was lucky.
I feel my scores were due to good luck.
I feel like I did well.
I do not feel like I could have done better.
I expected to do worse.
I am satisfied with my score.
I am proud of my decision strategy.
I am happy with my decision strategy.
My decision strategy was effective.
I feel good about my decision strategy.
I was focused on achieving positive outcomes.
In this task, I mostly thought about potential success.
I saw myself as striving to achieve good performance.
Mostly I imagined myself making good puzzle button selections.

Each of the five scales consisted of four items. Each item included possible ratings using
7 radial buttons, with the two sentences serving as opposite endpoints. Ratings were then coded
as -3 to 3, to indicate going from the negative to the positive end of the scale. The four scales
measuring attributions of skill and chance and satisfaction with performance and decision
strategy were modified from those used in the Judgment and Decision Making lab, which are
high in face validity. The fifth scale measured motivations to approach success versus avoid
failure. These motivational focus items were modified from the promotion/prevention scale to be
specific to the puzzle task (Lockwood, Jordan & Kunda, 2002, see also Summerville & Roese,
2008). A random sequence of all twenty items was created. Half of the items in each subscale
had the negative end of the scale on the left, while the other half had the negative end of the scale
on the right.
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Procedure
Participants played through 41 different puzzles in the experiment. Each of these puzzles
had the same underlying success rate, depending on the assigned condition. The first 10 puzzles
were termed the ‘Initial Skill’ puzzles. This stage was used to create the illusion of the potential
for skill to be involved. The next 30 puzzles were termed the ‘Calibration’ puzzles. This stage
was used to create the opportunity for participants to calibrate their success to their environment.
Afterwards, there was one final puzzle termed the ‘Prize Round’ puzzle. It served solely as a
motivational tool for the participants to continue to pay attention while playing the puzzles.
Although participants were told that their performance in this ‘Prize Round’ would determine the
kind of prize they would receive, all participants received the same small prize no matter their
performance.
Participants had the opportunity to choose a win/loss combo after every two puzzles had
been completed, as well as for the ‘Prize Round’ puzzle, for a total of 21 choices. The first 5
choices were in the ‘Initial Skill’ puzzles, the next 15 win/loss combo selections were in the
‘Calibration’ puzzles, and the final time a win/loss combo was chosen was for the ‘Prize Round.’
Having participants choose win/loss combos throughout the experiment allowed for eventual
analyses of risk taking over time—across ‘Initial Skill’ and ‘Calibration’ stages, as well as
combo selections early and late within the stages. Details about the step-by-step procedure are
outlined below.
Participants came into the laboratory and had free choice in seating. Once the session
started, instructions were read and three practice puzzles were shown to the participants. Along
with other information, participants were told that the purpose of this experiment was to measure
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“people’s general, intuitive ability to pattern match.” They were also told that rules existed that,
if followed, would “help them get the winning values most of the time” and obtain a higher point
total in the end. It was explained that “more points meant a better prize,” but no other specifics
about the point totals and prizes were given. The first practice puzzle was used to demonstrate
the task, and how different patterns could lead to a higher point total and better prize at the end
of the experiment. Before the final two practice puzzles, win/loss combo levels were explained.
Win/Loss Combo 1 and Win/Loss Combo 9 were used for the demonstration. In an attempt to
minimize possible order effects of anchoring, sessions were randomly assigned to instructions
that explained the practice puzzle with Win/Loss Combo 1 first or Win/Loss Combo 9 first. The
final two practice puzzles were used to demonstrate how a chosen win/loss combo level
determined the possible outcomes in the puzzle.
Participants then began the self-administered part of the session, always experiencing
their assigned success rate and selecting a new win/loss combo after every two puzzles were
played. They first played through the ‘Initial Skill’ puzzles. Participants were then informed of
their purported skill level based on their performance in those 10 puzzles. In reality, participants
were given one of two messages, depending on their assigned success rate. Those in the low
success rate group were told that they were slightly below average in skill compared to others
who had completed the experiment. Those in the high success rate group were told that they
were above average in skill compared to others who had participated in the experiment. This
information was consistent with the participant’s actual experienced performance during the
manipulated ‘Initial Skill’ puzzles. Participants then played through the ‘Calibration’ puzzles.
After the 30 ‘Calibration’ puzzles, the participants responded to the five exploratory scales.
Finally, the participants played the puzzle in the ‘Prize Round’.
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Once the self-administered part of the session was finished, the computer informed the
participant that the experiment had ended. They were then instructed to see the experimenter for
a debriefing sheet. At that time, they were given a small prize for completing the experiment.
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Results
Analyses were conducted to examine how success rate influenced risk taking behaviors,
beliefs about skill and chance, and motivational focus, as well as whether risk taking patterns
were calibrated to optimal outcome levels. Dependent measures included risk taking behaviors as
indicated by selected win/loss combos as well as scores on the five exploratory scales to
represent related attributions, satisfaction, and motivational focus.
Risk Taking
Success rate and risk taking. The influence of success rate on risk taking was examined
by analyzing the average of the two win/loss combos chosen at the beginning and end of the
‘Initial Skill’ puzzles, as well as the beginning and end of the ‘Calibration’ puzzles. Specifically,
a 2 x 2 x 2 Success Rate x Stage x Segment mixed ANOVA was conducted. Success rate was the
between-subjects variable, and consisted of high or low success rate. Stage and Segment were
within-subjects variables. Stage referred to the ‘Initial Skill’ and ‘Calibration’ puzzles, and
Segment referred to the early (beginning) and late (end) selections. The dependent variable was
risk taking, measured by the average of two adjacent win/loss combo selections. Taking the
average of two win/loss combos was done in an attempt to get a more reliable measure without
averaging over too many trials and thus inadvertently averaging over the effects of learning.
In accordance with experience-based paradigm predictions, it was hypothesized that
participants would be sensitive to their success rate, such that those with a high success rate
would take more risks than those with a low success rate. It was assumed that at the beginning of
28

the ‘Initial Skill’ puzzles, participants in both conditions would start by choosing intermediate
win/loss combos and avoid the extremes, since they had not yet experienced their success rate.
By the end of the ‘Initial Skill’ stage and the beginning of the ‘Calibration’ stage, participants
had their initial experience of doing well or poorly, so those who had a low success rate were
expected to begin to take fewer risks than those with a high success rate. By the last two win/loss
combo selections of the ‘Calibration’ puzzles, participants had had plenty of opportunities to
learn and experience their success rate. Provided that participants were in fact sensitive to their
success rate, significant differences in risk taking by the end were anticipated. Those with a low
success rate were then expected to decrease their risk taking even further and choose lower
win/loss combos, while those with a high success rate were expected to increase their risk taking
even further and choose higher win/loss combos.
As expected, there was a significant main effect of success rate, F(1,201)=21.60, p<.001,
partial η²=.097, with those who had a high success rate taking more risks overall (4.74, SE=.14)
than those who had a low success rate (3.81, SE=.14). Additionally, there were significant main
effects for stage, F(1,201)=61.94, p<001, partial η²=.24, and segment, F(1,201)=95.41, p<.001,
partial η²=.32. In both cases, more risks were taken in the later portions of the experiment. More
risks were taken overall in the ‘Calibration’ stage (4.74, SE=.12) than in the ‘Initial Skill’ stage
(3.81, SE=.11). Also, more risks were taken on average in late selections (4.72, SE=.12) than in
early selections (3.83, SE=.10).
Both stage and segment interacted with success rate to influence risk taking. The Success
Rate x Stage interaction, F(1,201)=41.90, p<.001, partial η²=.17, is shown in Figure 4. In the
‘Initial Skill’ puzzles, participants in both success rate conditions were fairly conservative and
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took on roughly the same amount of risk. Differences in risk taking between success
succ rate groups
arose in the ‘Calibration’ puzzles, such that those with a high success rate took on more risk than
those with a low success rate. The change was primarily due to an increase in risk taking by the
high success group; those
hose with a low success rate did not change their risk taking appreciably as
they started at a relatively low combo level and stayed there
there.

Figure 4. Success Rate (SR) x Stage interaction for risk taking. Risk taking was measured by the
average of two adjacent win/loss combo selections (Average Win/Loss Combo).. The higher the
average win/loss combo, the more risk taken. Results are averaged over segment. Standard error
bars are displayed.
As shown in Figure 5, success
uccess rate also significantly interacted with segment to influence
risk taking, F(1,201)=33.52, p<.001,
<.001, partial η²=.14.
²=.14. Similar to the Success Rate x Stage
interaction, in the early selections of a stage, both groups were conservative in their
heir win/loss
combo selections. Differences in risk taking were more pronounced in the late selections of a
30

stage, such that those with a high success rate took on even more risk than those with a low
success rate. Again, low success rate participants did not change their risk taking from early to
late selections as much as high success rate participants.

Figure 5. Success Rate (SR) x Segment interaction on risk taking. Early and late selections refer
the average of the first and last two win/loss combo selections in a stage, respectively. Risk
taking was measured by the average of two adjacent win/loss combo selections (Average
Win/Loss Combo). The higher the average win
win/loss
/loss combo, the more risk taken. Results are
averaged over stage. Standard error bars are displayed.
Stage significantly interacted with segment, F(1,201)=35.44, p<.001,
<.001, partial η²=.15, as
seen in Figure 6. The bigger differences in risk taking are seen between early and late selections
in the ‘Initial Skill’ stage, such that more risks are taken later in the ‘Initial Skill’ stage than
early. There are little to no differences in risk taking between early and late sele
selections
ctions in the
‘Calibration’ stage. This suggests that participants, regardless of success rate, adjusted their risk
taking between early and late selections in the ‘Initial Skill’ stage, with a shift towards risk
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seeking. Participants then did not signific
significantly adjust much further within early and late
selections of ‘Calibration’ stage.

Figure 6. Stage x Segment interaction
nteraction on risk taking. Early and late selections refer the average
of the first and last two win/loss combo selections in a stage, respectively. Risk taking was
measured by the average of two adjacent win/loss combo selections (Average Win/Loss Combo).
The higher the average win/loss
n/loss combo, the more risk taken. Results are averaged over success
rate. Standard error bars are displayed.
The patterns seen in these
se two
two-way interactions are in line with our expectations that
participants would be sensitive
ive to their success rate. When making the first two win/loss combo
selections, participants had little or no experience with their success rate, and differences
between success rate groups in risk taking were minimal or non
non-existent. More adjustments
a
in
risk taking were made within the ‘Initial Skill’ stage as participants began to experience their
success rate, and less were made in the ‘Calibration’ stage as participants had plenty of
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opportunities to learn about their success rate by that point. This was especially true for those in
the high success rate. It also seems that those in the low success rate may have experimented
with more risky combos early on but then gradually returned to safer levels. As the experiment
progressed and participants had those opportunities to learn about their success rate, differences
in risk taking between conditions became more pronounced.
The patterns are in accordance with general experience-based paradigm predictions. As
predicted by experience-based paradigm research, those with a high success rate eventually took
more risks compared to those with a low success rate. The Success Rate x Stage x Segment
interaction was not significant, F<1.
Success rate calibration of risk taking. Sensitivity to success rates was clearly observed
in the primary analysis, but we wanted to know how well participants used their experienced
success rate information to make the best risky decisions. To measure how well participants used
this information, a single-sample t-test was conducted for each success rate group. The t-test
compared the average of the last two win/loss combos selected to the optimal win/loss combo for
that success rate. Reaching the optimal level would indicate that success rate information was
used well, and that participants appropriately calibrated at least on average. This was a more
rigorous test of experience-based paradigm predictions of the underweighting of rare events as
the underlying rationale for the pattern. If results are consistent, then those with a low success
rate should have a lower average win/loss combo compared to their optimal, as they would
underestimate the rare event of doing well. Those with a high success rate should have a higher
average win/loss combo compared to their optimal, as they would underestimate the rare event of
doing poorly.
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The average of the last two win/loss combos in the ‘Calibration’ stage was found to be
significantly different than the optimal win/loss combo for both high and low success rate groups
bu tin the wrong direction. Those with a low success rate had an average win/loss combo of 3.77
(SD=1.79) which was above their optimal win/loss combo of three, t(101)=4.37, p<.001, d=.60.
Those with a high success rate had an average win/loss combo of 6.02 (SD=2.12) which was
below their optimal win/loss combo of seven, t(100)=4.61, p<.001, d=-.65.
These results suggest that participants were sensitive to their success rate, and eventually
gravitated in the appropriate direction towards their optimal win/loss combo, but failed to
calibrate completely. Participants ended up closer to the middle when selecting win/loss combos.
Unlike our predictions, the pattern of risk taking was not consistent with experience-based
paradigm predictions. Those with a low success rate took relatively more risks than optimal, and
those with a high success rate had a lower average win/loss combo compared to their optimal.
Secondary analyses of risk taking patterns. First, an analysis was done to determine
whether the randomly assigned combo levels in the instructions had any influence on the
relationship between success rate and risk taking. Furthermore, the average win/loss combo
selection made by those with a high or low success rate was plotted for each trial in order to
better understand and visualize how risk taking changed over time.
In an attempt to balance out the ordering effects of anchoring that could arise due to
explaining the win/loss combo examples using Combos 1 and 9 during instructions, the order of
their use had been randomly counterbalanced to each experimental session. A 2 x 2 Success Rate
x Instruction Order between-subjects ANOVA was conducted in order to determine if the
instructions had an influence on risk taking. Instruction order referred to the experimenter
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explaining the practice puzzle with Win/Loss Combo 1 then 9 or Win/Loss Combo 9 then 1. The
dependent variable was the average of the first 2 win/loss combo selections made in the ‘Initial
Skill’ puzzles. This was the chosen dependent variable because any effects of instructions would
most likely be of influence closer to when instructions were given, i.e., in the early win/loss
combo selections. No influence of instructions was found. The main effect of instructions was
not significant, F<1, indicating that risk taking did not differ as a function of instruction order.
Additionally, the Success Rate x Instruction Order interaction was not significant, F<1,
suggesting that the relationship between success rate and risk taking was not influenced by the
instructions.
Figure 7 depicts the win/loss combos selected over time by each success rate group.
Participants were able to discern quickly how well or poorly they were doing, as there were
already differences between the groups in average win/loss combos chosen between the
beginning and end of the ‘Initial Skill’ stage (trial 5). Those with a high success rate started to
increase their risk taking, as predicted. Those with a low success rate also significantly started to
increase their risk taking between the beginning and end of the ‘Initial Skill’ stage, t(101)=-5.21,
p<.001, d=-.52, which was not expected. Instead of responding to their success rate by
immediately taking fewer risks in the ‘Initial Skill’ stage, low success rate participants opted to
choose higher win/loss combos, potentially because they were still exploring or thought they
could improve their skill. However, by the end of the ‘Initial Skill’ stage, low success rate
participants took fewer risks relative to high success rate participants, t(201)=2.42, p<.05, d=.34.
These relative differences became more pronounced after receiving the message about purported
skill level between the ‘Initial Skill’ and ‘Calibration’ stages (between trial 5 and 6).
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Figure 7. Risks taken over time by success rate group. Each point corresponds to the average
win/loss combo selection by success rate group for each trial (once every two puzzles). The
higher the average win/loss combo, the more risk taken. Vertical lines show separation between
stages. Trials 1 through 5 are in the Initial Skill stage. The skill message was delivered between
Trial 5 and 6. Trials 6 through 20 are in the Calibration stage. Trial 21 refers to the win/loss
combo chosen for the Prize Round puzzle. Horizontal lines refer to the optimal win/loss combos.
Seven is the optimal for the high success rate group, three for the low success rate group.
As seen in Figure 7, as time passed and more puzzles were played, those with a high
success rate gradually took more ris
risks.
ks. However, by the last trial in the ‘Calibration’ stage (trial
20), 54% of participants were still relatively risk averse on average compared to their optimal
win/loss combo of seven. Nevertheless, another 33% were relatively risk seeking on average
compared
ared to their optimal win/loss combo, and 13% took on their optimal amount of risk. Thus,
there was considerable variability in risk taking even at the end of 20 trials.
Those with a low success rate started at a low combo and gradually increased their risk
taking in the initial stage, but then gradually drifted toward taking fewer risks. By
B Trial 20, 57%
of the participants were still relatively risk seeking on average compared to their optimal
win/loss combo of three. Another 28% were relatively risk averse on average,, and 15% took on
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their optimal amount of risk. Again, there were noticeable individual differences in the selection
of final risk levels, though as a group risk taking had drifted in a more conservative direction
relative to those with the high success rate.
Exploratory Analyses Regarding Satisfaction, Attributions and Motivational Focus
Satisfaction with decision strategy and overall performance, and attributions regarding
the role of skill and chance were examined along with motivational focus. These were measured
using five four-item scales, and were included as exploratory dependent variables of interest.
Scores were reverse-coded when necessary to ensure that a higher score indicated a move
towards the positive end of the scale. Final score ranges can be seen in Table 3. The score range
remained -3 to 3 for all scales except skill. Skill was re-coded to a range of 0 to 3 in order to
better represent the opposite ends of the scale—beliefs that no skill was involved to beliefs that
skill was especially involved.
Before combining the items, they were tested for reliability. Table 3 lists the items used
in subsequent analyses and the final reliability. The skill and decision strategy satisfaction scales
maintained each of their four original items. The performance satisfaction and chance/luck scales
each had one of their original items removed to achieve optimal reliability. Reliability on these
four adjusted scales were all in excess of .75 and were deemed acceptable. The success/failure
focus scale, however, did not achieve acceptable reliability, α=.57.
In an attempt to take a cursory look at motivational focus since the success/failure scale
did not achieve acceptable reliability, an independent samples t-test was conducted to see if there
were any differences between success rates in average scores on one item from the scale. The
item used was “I was focused on avoiding negative outcomes/achieving positive outcomes.” It
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was used because it was most closely aligned to motivational focus. No significant differences
on this item were found between the two success rate conditions, t(201)=-1.15, p=.25. High and
low success rate participants had an average score of .52 and .85, respectively, indicating that
participants in both success rate groups had a slight tendency to focus more on achieving positive
outcomes. Thus, we have no evidence for our hypothesis that motivational focus would differ
based on success rate. Due to the lack of reliability of the subscale and no differences found in a
crucial item, motivational focus was not included in the remaining analyses.
Table 3. Final Scale Items Used in Analyses with α and Score Ranges
Construct
Negative End of Scale
Skill
My current total was not due to my skill.
Skill
My skill had no influence over my performance.
Skill
My skill is not responsible for how much I won or lost.
Skill
My skill had nothing to do with my scores.
Chance/Luck
I was unlucky in my puzzle outcomes.
Chance/Luck
Overall I was unlucky.
Chance/Luck
I feel that my scores were due to bad luck.
Performance Satisfaction
I feel like I did not do well.
Performance Satisfaction
I expected to do better.
Performance Satisfaction
I am not satisfied with my score.
Decision Strategy Satisfaction I am disappointed in my decision strategy.
Decision Strategy Satisfaction I am not happy with my decision strategy.
Decision Strategy Satisfaction My decision strategy was not effective.
Decision Strategy Satisfaction I feel bad about my decision strategy.

Positive End of Scale
My current total was due to my skill.
My skill had substantial influence over my performance.
My skill is responsible for how much I won or lost.
My skill had everything to do with my scores.
I was lucky in my puzzle outcomes.
Overall I was lucky.
I feel my scores were due to good luck.
I feel like I did well.
I expected to do worse.
I am satisfied with my score.
I am proud of my decision strategy.
I am happy with my decision strategy.
My decision strategy was effective.
I feel good about my decision strategy.

α Score Range
0.79

0 to 3

0.75

-3 to 3

0.79

-3 to 3

0.83

-3 to 3

Note. Skill was re-coded as 0 to 3 to better represent the items at the end of the scale.
Chance/luck and performance satisfaction scales each had an item removed to achieve optimal
reliability. The success/failure focus scale is not present in this table because acceptable
reliability was not achieved.
Satisfaction with performance and decision strategy. Ratings of satisfaction with
performance and decision strategy were used as a manipulation check. Those with a high success
rate should be more satisfied with their performance and decision strategy than those with a low
success rate, because they were generally doing well in the task. T-tests were conducted for both
of these scales in order to see whether there were the expected differences in ratings between
success rate groups.
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Figure 8 shows the satisfaction results. In line with our predictions, those
hose with a high
success rate were more satisfied with their performance, t(201)=13.94,
(201)=13.94, p<.001, and their decision
strategy, t(201)=10.81, p<.001,
.001, than those with a low success rate. Low success rate was
associated with negative ratings of performance as expected. However, those with a high
success rate were not particularly satisfied in general, suggesting that something other than doing
well was affecting satisfaction,, or that their aspirations for success were higher than the 67%
they were achieving. Thus, our manipulation check was effective in a relative sense but only
weakly effective in an absolute sense
sense.

High SR

Low SR

High SR

Low SR

Decision Strategy

Performance

Figure 8. Ratings of satisfaction
atisfaction with performance and decision strategy for each success rate
r
(SR). The average satisfaction rating was the average of the scores on the corresponding final
scale items. Ratings were from -33 (very dissatisfied) to 3 (very satisfied). Standard error bars are
displayed.
The role of skill and chance
hance. Before any analyses were conducted regarding the role of
skill and chance, chance/luck scores were re
re-coded from a scale of -3
3 (bad luck) to +3 (good
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luck) to a scale of 0 to 3 so they could attempt to be compared to skill scores. Zero referred to
beliefs that chance did not play a role in performance, and three referred to beliefs that chance
had a lot to do with performance (irrespective of whether the influence was good or bad). This
was similar for the skill scale, in which zero referred to beliefs that skill did not play a role in
performance, and three referred to beliefs that skill played a significant role in performance. Due
to the re-coding of skill and chance/luck, it is possible that the scores are not entirely
comparable, as one full step in skill is actually a half step after the re-coding. For the purpose of
exploratory analyses, comparability was tentatively assumed.
One set of exploratory analyses consisted of a t-test comparing each success rate group in
order to examine overall differences in attributions of skill and chance. Results were somewhat
in accordance with our predictions, and can be seen in Figure 9. Skill was believed to play more
of a role in performance than chance in the high success rate group only, t(100)=7.46, p<.001, as
their skill ratings were significantly higher than chance ratings. The differences between skill and
chance ratings in the low success rate group were not significant, t(101)=.95, n.s., suggesting that
participants did not believe skill or chance to play more of a role than the other in performance.
In a test of the self-serving bias, we compared attributions regarding skill and chance
across success rates. Those in the high success rate condition rated skill as having more to do
with their performance than those with a low success rate, t(201)=3.79, p<.001. Conversely,
those with a high success rate rated chance as having less to do with their performance than those
with a low success rate, t(201)=-2.19, p<.05. This is consistent with pervasive findings of selfserving bias in the literature (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). While we found results that went
along with our predictions in general, it seems a bit surprising that average scores on both scales
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were small to moderate. Thus, part
participants in neither condition seemed to think skill or chance
played an especially large role in performance.

Figure 9. Overall differences in attributions of skill and chance between success rate (SR)
groups. The transformed average score refers to the average of the scores on the corresponding
final scale items. The average scores were than transformed so that all ratings went from 0
(played no role) to 3 (played a significant role). Standard error bars are displayed.
isplayed.
To explore whether attributions of skill and chance were specifically related to risk
taking, the relationship between skill ratings and risk taking, as well as chance/luck ratings and
risk taking, were studied within each success rate. This all
allowed for a test of how well our results
matched our hot hand related predictions
predictions. If our results fit, then for those with a high success
rate, higher skill ratings should be associated with more risks being taken given an expectation of
continued successes. For those with a low success rate, higher skill ratings should be associated
with less risks being taken given an expectation of continued failures
failures.. Correlations were
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computed to look at these possible relationships. The risk taking dependent variable consisted of
the average of the last 2 win/loss combo selections in the Calibration Stage.
No significant associations were found between attributions of skill/chance and risk
taking, in either condition. The skill rating and risk taking correlation was not significant in
either the high success rate, r(99)=.05, n.s., or the low success rate, r(100)=-.03, n.s., groups.
There was also no significant association between chance/luck ratings and risk taking for the
high success rate, r(99)=-.06, n.s., and the low success rate, r(100)=-.02, n.s., groups. Since we
had sufficient power to detect a relationship and there were no issues of variability in attribution
scores or risk taking, these results go against hot hand related predictions.
Summary
To summarize, participants were sensitive to their success rate. Their risk preferences
patterns looked similar to experience-based paradigm predictions overall, such that those with a
high success rate took more risks than those with a low success rate. However, when calibration
was tested, high success rate participants ended the experiment by choosing win/loss combos less
risky than their optimal, while low success rate participants ended by choosing combos more
risky than their optimal. In addition, low success rate participants had a slight tendency to
increase their risk taking early on, and only with additional experience to drop back down to a
lower level of risk.
Overall attributions of skill and chance were in accordance with predictions of a selfserving bias. Those with a high success rate believed skill to be more at play than chance,
whereas skill and chance were seen as having a similar role by low success rate participants.
When the association between the attributions and risk taking was analyzed, however, hot hand
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related predictions were not confirmed, and beliefs about skill and chance did not seem to be
related to risk taking behavior.
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Discussion
This study examined how risk preferences are influenced by one’s experienced success
rate in an uncertain environment, using a task that captured characteristics of many real world
environments. The results suggest that people are sensitive to their success rate, in that
participants changed their risk taking behavior after only a few trials. High success rate
participants responded in the expected direction and started taking more risks after a few trials.
Low success rate participants initially started taking more risks despite their low success rate, but
still chose safer win/loss combos compared to high success rate participants. As the trials
progressed, those who had a high success rate began taking on more risk and those with a low
success rate gradually began taking fewer risks.
Comparisons to Experience-Based Paradigms
We had expected that the above risk preference pattern would be similar to the typical
pattern found when using experience-based paradigms. This was because experience-based
paradigms, similar to our experiment, rely on the participant experiencing probability through a
series of events rather than through a numeric description as in description-based paradigms. The
usual risk preference pattern predicted by experience-based paradigms is risk seeking in the
positive domain, or with a high success rate, and risk aversion in the negative domain, or with a
low success rate. Results supported experience-based paradigm predictions. Those with a high
success rate took more risks relative to those with a low success rate, even when a shift towards
risk seeking was found for both success rate groups in the ‘Initial Skill’ stage.
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In the ‘Initial Skill’ stage, the shift towards risk seeking was expected for those with a
high success rate only. Those with a low success rate may have initially started to take risks in
this stage because they expected their skill to get better as they played more puzzles. Skill is
often thought of as working in one direction; developing skill through effort would typically be
expected to improve performance, not hurt it (e.g., Schneider, 2001). However, by the end of the
initial stage, low success rate participants took fewer risks than those with a high success rate,
and this pattern gradually continued in the ‘Calibration’ stage, as expected from experiencebased paradigm predictions. This might have been because after more experiences of doing
poorly, low success rate participants realized they were not improving and adjusted their risk
taking behavior accordingly.
To more rigorously test whether our results were in line with experience-based paradigm
predictions about underweighting of rare events, we examined how well people calibrated their
performance to their success rate. Those who had a high success rate were expected to take on
more risk relative to their optimal level by the end because they would underestimate the rare
event of doing poorly. Alternatively, those with a low success rate were expected to take on less
risk relative to their optimal level by the end, as they would underestimate the rare event of doing
well. Our results demonstrate that participants moved in the direction towards their optimal level
of risk, but were just shy of reaching it. Those with a high success rate took on less risk relative
to their optimal, and those with a low success rate took on more risk relative to their optimal.
These tendencies were not consistent with experience-based paradigm predictions overall.
Their tendencies could be seen as more in line with description-based paradigm
predictions, suggesting the possible overweighting of rare events. We did not expect calibration
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results to be similar to description-based paradigm predictions because probabilities were not
made explicit in the puzzle task. Thus, the reason for the overweighting of rare events, if that is
what is happening, is unclear. Both paradigms rely on an explanation focused on the process of
underweighting or overweighting of rare events. Given the partial compatibility of our results
with both paradigms, a conflict arises suggesting that processes other than (and possibly in
addition to) the weighting of rare events may influence risk taking tendencies in uncertain
environments.
One possibility is that the calibration results might be due to an affinity for the status quo.
The status quo effect (e.g., Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988) refers to the decision to do nothing
and maintain a current or previous position. It is a bias when people more often choose to stick
with the status quo alternative than another alternative. In terms of the puzzle task, the status quo
would be similar to choosing the same win/loss combo throughout the experiment in order to
maintain the current position. The status quo bias could explain why participants as a group
eventually stuck with choosing more intermediate win/loss combos, leading to a middling effect
by the end of the experiment. Once participants experienced their success rate in the initial trials
and changed their risk taking accordingly, the cost of choosing another alternative (i.e., a
different win/loss combo) besides what they had already been choosing might not have seemed
worth it. It might not have been worth it to participants because they were aware that the
experiment involved an element of uncertainty, and the perceived potential cost of trying out a
different win/loss combo might have outweighed any potential benefit to their performance.
Another possibility is that the calibration results might be due to an anchoring and
adjustment strategy used by participants. Anchoring and adjustment is one of three classic
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heuristics proposed by Tversky & Kahneman (1974) in which an initial reference point (i.e.,
anchor) is adopted, insufficient adjustments are made, and the resulting judgment is often biased
towards the anchor (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Furnham & Boo, 2011). In terms of
calibration, this would mean that participants could have anchored onto their initial win/loss
combo selection. Initial selections were fairly conservative suggesting a typical anchor that
avoided extremes and was slightly risk averse relative to the middle of the scale. Although
participants as a group made adjustments in the appropriate direction, they might have made
insufficient adjustments and stayed closer to intermediate win/loss combos, thus leading to a
middling effect by the end of the experiment. It is interesting to note that since there were no
significant effects of instruction order on risk taking, participants most likely were not adopting
either of the (extreme) win/loss combo examples from the instructions as their starting anchors,
and instead tended to use an intermediate but relatively cautious starting point.
The status quo bias and an anchoring and adjustment strategy both suggest that, after
participants as a group initially changed their risk taking in the appropriate direction, their
subsequent adjustments in risk taking were small. This led them to just miss reaching their
optimal level of risk (as a group). According to the status quo bias, small adjustments were made
because participants as a group preferred maintaining their current level of risk instead of
choosing different win/loss combos. An anchoring and adjustment strategy suggests that small
adjustments were made because participants anchored on to their initial intermediate win/loss
combo selections. Both suggest a tendency to adjust conservatively relative to some default. This
tendency might be especially common in situations of uncertainty.

47

The tendency to adjust conservatively may also be because participants did not feel that
skill did not play a large role in performance overall. Since skill was not seen as having an
overwhelming part in determining performance, participants may have not felt the need to go to
the extremes. High success rate participants may not have thought that skill was playing a major
role but they could recognize that they were doing well, so they increased the risks taken to a
certain point but ended up below the optimal. Low success rate participants may also not have
thought that skill was a crucial factor but they could recognize that they were doing poorly, so
they decreased their risks taken to a certain point and ended up above the optimal. It is also
possible that more time spent playing the puzzles and a stronger skill manipulation was
necessary in order for participants to reach their optimal level.
Evidence for experience-based paradigms is mixed. We found similar risk preference
patterns overall, but calibration results suggest that something else might be driving how
participants ability to approach an optimal level of risk besides or in addition to the weighting of
rare events. The tendency to adjust conservatively, based on a conservative win/loss combo
anchor or a preference for maintaining the current position, may have led to the middling effect
by the end of the experiment. Furthermore, introducing the element of skill may have changed
how participants approached decisions involving risk in ways not predicted by experience-based
paradigms.
Potential for Individual Differences
Generally, it seems that participants started off with a conservative but intermediate
anchor, made adjustments as they experienced their success rate, and gradually leveled off in
terms of the amount of risk they were willing to take on. While it is important to understand this
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group behavior, there were also noticeable individual differences. Variations were possible in the
starting anchor, and how often and when each participant fluctuated in their risk taking from trial
to trial. For instance, individuals differed in how well they calibrated their success to their
environment. Some individuals were better or worse at calibrating than others. Out of those who
had a high success rate, just over half took fewer risks in the end compared to their optimal level
of risk. The remaining participants either took on more risk in the end compared to their optimal,
or took on the optimal amount of risk. Out of those who had a low success rate, more than half
took on more risk in the end compared to their optimal. The remaining participants either took on
fewer risks in the end compared to their optimal, or took on the optimal amount of risk.
Exploring individual differences further will help to illuminate why people within success rate
groups differed in their risk taking, as well as why some people were more or less calibrated.
This thesis attempted to explore how motivational focus differed as a function of success
rate and not in terms of individual differences. Exploratory evidence for motivational focus
differences between groups was not found in the puzzle task. The success/failure focus scale was
unreliable, suggesting that simply transforming items from a previous promotion/prevention
scale was not enough to show whether participants as a group were motivated towards the
positive or away from the negative. The critical item used to explore if there were any
differences in motivational focus between success rate groups also did not support the idea that
those with a high success rate would approach the positive and those with a low success rate
would avoid the negative. It is possible then that the experience of success rate was not enough
to push people towards focusing on the positive or avoiding the negative, but that we may have
found significant individual differences in motivational focus if we had measured them. A
person’s tendency to approach the positive or avoid the negative might influence how they used
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their successes and failures to inform them of how much risk to take on. An example of a
relevant theory is SP/A theory (e.g., Lopes, 1983), which suggests that there is a dispositional
factor of being more security or potential focused, and this might lead one person to take a risk
and another to play it safe, even if they had the same success rate.
Another individual difference to be explored in future research is beliefs about luck. In a
situation that involves an element of chance, how that chance element is believed to work either
for or against someone might drive risk taking. Darke and Freedman (1997) constructed the
Belief in Good Luck (BIGL) scale, which assesses individual differences with respect to beliefs
about luck. People can maintain the view that luck is fairly stable and influences outcomes in
their favor. For example, if people are more disposed to view chance as working in their favor,
then they might expect their likelihood of succeeding to increase as a result of this, and would be
more risk seeking than people who did not have this inclination. Others may believe that luck is
less stable and more random, and would then have different risk preference patterns. This thesis
addressed beliefs about chance and luck, but only specific to the task environment. Studying how
beliefs about luck differ as a function of individuals remains to be explored. A variety of other
individual differences, including both cognitive and motivational factors, might be worth
exploring.
The Role of Beliefs about Skill and Chance
This thesis expanded upon the experience-based paradigm by including elements of both
skill and chance. The puzzle task did not include real skill, but the illusion of skill. This was of
greater interest because in real world situations, we often do not know how much skill we have
or how much of an influence it has on outcomes. People then must rely on success rate
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information to help them figure out how much skill they have and how much of a role it plays in
outcomes. Therefore, we were interested in beliefs about skill and chance.
Results suggest that participants may have a relatively sophisticated understanding of
events in that they infer that both skill and chance are factors in their performance. In both the
high and low success rate conditions, participants acknowledged that both were likely to play a
role in their outcomes. It seems likely that people are aware of the trade-off between skill and
chance, even though they cannot directly differentiate the two based on experience.
Whether or not results were consistent with the expectation regarding the continuation of
streaks in the hot hand (e.g., Laplace, 1951) or gambler’s fallacy (e.g., Gilovich, Vallone,
Tversky, 1985) research is a more complicated issue. When looking at the association between
skill and risk taking for each success rate, there were no significant relationships. Higher skill
ratings were not associated with taking more risks for high success rate participants, or fewer
risks for low success rate participants.
This conflicts with the literature, which suggests that how success rate is interpreted is
related to beliefs about the role of skill and chance (e.g., Ayton & Fisher, 2004; Burns & Corpus,
2004), and that streaks are expected to continue when skill is involved. When skill is involved,
streaks of doing well were expected to be related to taking more risks and streaks of doing poorly
were expected to be related to taking fewer risks. However, it is possible that participants did not
feel like they had enough skill to depend on it when deciding whether or not to take risks. In
essence, participants might not have felt that their hand was “hot” enough. Focusing on how
much one believes skill to be at play, or how much success is needed to feel confident that
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successes will continue, may be as important as whether or not one believes skill to be a factor at
all.
There was no evidence for a relationship between skill ratings and risk taking within each
success rate group. A more precise test of hot hand predictions would include an evaluation of
the relationship between risk taking behavior and actually experienced streaks of a particular
outcome, within each success rate group.
Conclusions and Future Directions
Real world situations often appear to involve both skill and chance. In these situations,
we often do not know exactly how much skill we have, or how big or small a role it plays in
determining outcomes. Success rate information can then become very useful in gauging the role
of skill and chance in determining outcomes. When in an environment that appears to involve
skill and chance, people seem to be sensitive to and use their success rate when making risky
decisions. Doing well and having a high success rate leads to taking more risks in the puzzle
task. Doing poorly and having a low success rate leads to taking fewer risks in the puzzle task,
once an expectation that performance will improve as time passes is disconfirmed. Future studies
are needed to better understand what happens when uncertain situations have an element of skill
involved.
This thesis addressed how using a success rate in lieu of exact probability information
influenced risk taking, as well as the role of skill and chance in interpreting success rate
information. This thesis did not address what happens when success rate changes, or when
evidence for skill and chance changes. Real world environments not only typically lack exact
information regarding probabilities and the amount of skill and chance involved, but this
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information typically does not always remain constant. There can be more or less uncertainty in
the environment, and one can attempt to improve their skill or may face situations that reduce
their skill. These factors can change one at a time, or in tandem. If we know that people seem to
be sensitive to and use their success rate when making decisions in a situation where they are
experiencing a constant success rate, they may react differently when their experience changes in
these various ways. Answering this question is a likely next step for better understanding how
people respond to risk in real world environments that involve elements of both skill and chance.

53

References
Arrow, K. (1965). Aspects of the theory of risk bearing. Helsinki: Yrjo Jahnssonis Saatio.
Atkinson, J. (1957). Motivational determinants of risk-taking behavior. Psychological Review,
64(6), 359–372.
Ayton, P., & Fischer, I. (2004). The hot hand fallacy and the gambler’s fallacy: Two faces of
subjective randomness?, Memory & Cognition, 32(8), 1369-1378.
Barron, G & Erev, I. (2003). Small feedback-based decisions and their limited correspondence to
description-based decisions. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 16, 215-233.
Bernoulli, D. (1954). Exposition of a new theory on the measurement of risk. Econometrica:
Journal of the Econometric Society, 23–36. (Original work published in 1738)
Brehmer, B. (1980). In one word: Not from experience. Acta Psychologica, 45, 223-241.
Burns, B. D., & Corpus, B. (2004). Randomness and inductions from streaks: “Gambler’s
fallacy” versus “hot hand”. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review,11(1), 179-184.
Campbell, W. K., & Sedikides, C. (1999). Self-threat magnifies the self-serving bias: A metaanalytic integration. Review of General Psychology, 3(1), 23.
Chemers, M. M., Hu, L., & Garcia, B. F. (2001). Academic self-efficacy and first year college
student performance and adjustment. Journal of Educational Psychology, 93(1), 55–64.
Croson, R. & Sundali, J. (2005). The gambler’s fallacy and hot hand: Empirical data from
casinos. The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 30(3), 195-209.
Crowe, E. & Higgins, E. (1997). Regulatory focus and strategic inclinations: Promotion and
prevention in decision making. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,
69, 117-132.
Darke, P. R., & Freedman, J. L. (1997). The belief in good luck scale. Journal of Research in
Personality, 31(4), 486-511.
Erev, I., Ert, E., Roth, A., Haruvy, E., Herzog, S., Hau, R., Hertwig, R., Stewart, T., West, R., &
Lebiere, C. (2009). A choice prediction competition for choices from experience and
from description. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 23, 15-47.
Furnham, A., & Boo, H. C. (2011). A literature review of the anchoring effect. The Journal of
Socio-Economics, 40(1), 35-42.
Fugate, M., Kinicki, A. J., & Ashforth, B. E. (2004). Employability: A psycho-social construct,
its dimensions, and applications. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 65(1), 14–38.
Gilovich, T., Vallone, R., & Tversky, A. (1985). The hot hand in basketball: On the
misattribution of random sequences. Cognitive Psychology, 17(3), 295–314.
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley.
Hertwig, R. & Erev, I. (2009). The description-experience gap in risky choice. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 13(12), 517-523.
Holzworth, R.J. (2001). Multiple cue probability learning. In Hammond K. R., & Stewart, T. R.
(eds.), The essential Brunswik: Beginnings, explications, applications, New York: Oxford
University Press. (pp. 348–350).
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk.
54

Econometrica, 263–291.
Laplace, P.S. (1951). A philosophical essay on probabilities. New York: Dover. (Original work
published in 1820).
Lockwood, P., Jordan, C., & Kunda, Z. (2002). Motivation by positive or negative role models:
Regulatory focus determines who will best inspire us. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 83(4), 854-864.
Lopes, L. L. (1983). Some thoughts on the psychological concept of risk. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 8, 137-144.
Samuelson, W., & Zeckhauser, R. (1988). Status quo bias in decision making. Journal of Risk
and Uncertainty, 1(1), 7-59.
Schneider, S. L. (2001). In search of realistic optimism: Meaning, knowledge, and warm
fuzziness. American Psychologist, 56(3), 250-263.
Schneider, S., Stershic, S., & Ranieri, A. (2013). The effect of positive and negative experience
on risk taking. Manuscript in preparation.
Sitkin, S. B., & Weingart, L. R. (1995). Determinants of risky decision-making behavior: A test
of the mediating role of risk perceptions and propensity. Academy of Management
Journal, 38(6), 1573–1592.
Summerville, A. & Roese, N. (2008). Self-report measures of individual differences in
regulatory focus: A cautionary note. Journal of Research in Personality, 42(1), 247-254.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and
biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124-1131.

55

